Sunday, July 24, 2016

Intersections are Dangerous



Intersections are Dangerous: Be Careful Out There[1]
Dale G. Larrimore, Esquire
            Intersections have long been recognized by our courts as areas of inherent danger for motorists and pedestrians. As early as 1922, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a higher degree of care is expected from drivers at all street crossing, compared to that due at other points on our highways or roads.[2] When operating a motor vehicle approaching an intersection, a motorist must exercise a “high degree of care,” that level of care that a prudent person would exercise whenever faced with circumstances that are “fraught with the hazard of danger.”[3] Every motorist must “drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection.”[4]
The operator of a vehicle at an intersection has the duty to look out for what is normally at intersections, the duty to look for pedestrians who may be crossing at the intersection, and the duty to have his vehicle under control in such manner that he would normally be able to stop if there were any impediment to his travel. The presence of traffic moving in different directions within an intersection requires extreme care and alertness on the part of motorists.[5] With rare exception, when two vehicles approach an intersection “one cutting across the bow of another who holds his course cannot collide with him unless one or both are somehow careless: if either stops in time, no accident can happen.”[6]
When approaching an intersection, a driver must be vigilant and exercise a high degree of care, with her vehicle under such control that she can stop on the shortest possible notice.[7] The presence of intersecting roadways, not the location of vehicles on the roadways, creates this enhanced duty of care. Motorists are always duty-bound to abide by the rules of common sense and, general rules of negligence dictate that one should not drive into an intersection when another vehicle is approaching and where the margin of safety is so fine that a reasonably prudent person would not be justified in believing he or she had adequate time to cross.[8] Drivers must reasonably scan the intersection for traffic conditions that may pose a hazard, looking first to the left and then to the right.[9]
            Duties are expectantly altered when there are traffic lights controlling the flow of traffic through an intersection. Where a driver has a green light in his or her favor, the duty to continue to look is less than when the intersection is uncontrolled.[10] There is a right to assume that other drivers will obey the law and a motorist faced with a green traffic light may rely on another driver’s obligation to observe and obey the red traffic control facing such motorist.[11] Such a motorist also has no affirmative duty to continue looking after entering the intersection.[12]
A driver with a green light for traffic in her direction has the “right-of-way” but it is important to recognize that this is a qualified right-of-way and the operator of vehicle on a through street must take such precautions in regard to the control and speed of his car and keeping an alert lookout for cars approaching the intersection as any reasonably prudent man solicitous of his own safety would take.[13] The question of when a driver is negligent for failing to be properly observant when entering an intersection with a light in his or her favor requires a determination by the jury as to the reasonableness of the driver's actions under the circumstances.[14] 
            Before entering an intersection, think left-right-left. A driver should first look left to observe whether any vehicles are approaching from the first lane you would cross. Then look right to see if it will be clear to cross the entire intersection. Then back left again to make sure nothing came up suddenly while you were looking right. Then it is OK to move forward into this area of danger. Where a motorist does not have the right-of-way, or is at an uncontrolled intersection, or where the initial view of the intersection is obstructed, the motorist must continue to exercise due care by looking for traffic while advancing through the intersection.[15] Without the right-of-way, drivers crossing an intersection must again look to the right when nearing the middle of the street and before entering into a traffic lane coming from that direction.[16] A driver may proceed if and when he has a reasonable belief that the intersection can be completely crossed without a collision.[17]   

             The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code mandates that motorists shall not “drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards existing.”[18] The reasonableness of the speed of a vehicle is based on a variety of circumstances, including the time of day (day vs night), road conditions, weather conditions, traffic congestion and the presence of other vehicles and pedestrians in the path about to be traveled.[19] A motor vehicle operator approaching an intersection is not bound to make a “mathematical calculation” concerning the chances of passing safely through the intersection, but the operator should not take chances in attempting to cross an intersection where common sense would require stopping or slowing down.[20] A motorist who operates his or her vehicle above the posted speed limit for that roadway forfeits his or her statutory right-of-way over another vehicle lawfully entering the intersection at approximately the same time.[21]
Adverse weather conditions always necessitate extra precautions for drivers and the combination of bad weather and the presence of an intersection results in the need for special vigilance. More specifically, a much greater degree of care is imposed upon motorists confronted with unusual weather conditions at an intersection.[22] Rain increases the care required of a driver approaching an intersection.[23]  Where visibility is obscured, a motorist must operate his or her vehicle with consideration of the limited vision available. A truck driver has been held to have a duty to moderate speed at an intersection on a rainy and foggy night so as to be able to stop before striking anyone reasonably likely to appear in the path of the truck.[24] An unusual or complex traffic pattern imposes an exceptional degree of vigilance on drivers approaching and traversing the intersection.[25]            
            There is also a correspondingly higher degree of care that is demanded of motorists at an intersection where pedestrians are present or expected to be present.[26]  A driver has a duty to anticipate the presence of pedestrians at an intersection and to control his or her vehicle so that no harm will result.[27] Vehicles entering an intersection with a green light, or turning right or left in an intersection, must yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time the signal is exhibited.[28]  A pedestrian, crossing in the crosswalk at an intersection, has the superior right of way over a car.[29] 
Operators of authorized emergency vehicles are granted certain privileges that may excuse the disregard of traffic signals.[30] In addition, the directions of a uniformed police officer always take priority over any traffic control device, and a vehicle operator has no obligation to obey any traffic control device if directed otherwise by a police officer.[31] 


[1] For a more thorough and detailed analysis of Pennsylvania law controlling the operation of vehicles through intersections, see Dale G. Larrimore, Pennsylvania Rules of the Road, §§ 3.1-3.5 (West’s PennsylvaniaPractice Series, Vol. 13)(2015-2016).
[2] Mooney v. Kinder, 271 Pa. 485, 115 A. 826 (1922).
[3] Lieberman v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 179, 188 A.2d 719 (1963).
[4] 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361.
[5] Com. v. Kaulback, 256 Pa. Super. 13, 389 A.2d 152 (1978).
[6] Cobb v. Chubeck, 399 Pa. 201, 203, 160 A.2d 207, 209 (1960).
[7] Schreckengost v. Kraft, 415 Pa. 567, 204 A.2d 646 (1964).
[8] Coventry v. Keith, 175 Pa. Super. 504, 106 A.2d 658 (1954); McMillan v. Mor Heat Oil & Equipment Co., 174 Pa. Super. 308, 101 A.2d 413 (1953).
[9] Heimburger v. Gundy, 348 Pa. 114, 34 A.2d 489 (1943); Zeigler v. Gullong, 168 Pa. Super. 637, 82 A.2d 588 (1951).
[10] Bascelli v. Bucci, 244 Pa. Super. 347, 368 A.2d 754 (1976).
[11] Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 58 A.2d 57 (1948); Spraggins v. Shields, 310 Pa. Super. 408, 456 A.2d 1000 (1983).
[12] Imes v. Empire Hook & Ladder Co., 247 Pa. Super. 470, 372 A.2d 922 (1977).
[13] Platts v. Driscoll, 245 Pa. Super. 235, 369 A.2d 381 (1976).
[14] Andrews v. Long, 425 Pa. 152, 228 A.2d 760 (1967); Zumbo v. Ellis, 232 Pa. Super. 566, 334 A.2d 770 (1975).
[15] Smith v. Brooks, 394 Pa. Super. 327, 575 A.2d 926 (1990).
[16] Burish v. Digon, 416 Pa. 486, 206 A.2d 497 (1965).
[17] Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285 (3d Cir.1993), citing Pokusa v. Taylor, 409 Pa. 41, 185 A.2d 331 (1962).
[18]  75 Pa.C.S. § 3361.
[19] Smith v. Brooks, 394 Pa. Super. 327, 575 A.2d 926 (1990); Bohner v. Stine, 316 Pa. Super. 426, 463 A.2d 438 (1983).
[20] Tomsel v. Green, 150 Pa. Super. 547, 549, 29 A.2d 339, 340 (1942).
[21] Schreckengost v. Kraft, 415 Pa. 567, 204 A.2d 646 (1964).
[22] Grimes v. Yellow Cab Co., 344 Pa. 298, 25 A.2d 294 (1942).
[23] Salkin v. James, 376 Pa. 205, 102 A.2d 168 (1954).
[24] Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 164 A. 799 (1933).
[25] Lieberman v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 179, 188 A.2d 719 (1963).
[26] Mooney v. Kinder, 271 Pa. 485, 115 A. 826 (1922); Mack v. Ferebee, 204 Pa. Super. 129, 203 A.2d 350 (1964).
[27] Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A.2d 626 (1944).
[28] 75 Pa.C.S. §3112(a)(1)(i).
[29] Jenkins v. Wolf, 2006 PA Super 321, 911 A.2d 568 (2006).
[30] See 75 Pa.C.S. §3105, and Dale G. Larrimore, Pennsylvania Rulesof the Road, § 7.2 (West’s Pennsylvania Practice Series, Vol. 13)(2015-2016).  
[31] 75 Pa.C.S. §§3102 and 3111(a).

Friday, July 15, 2016

Statutes of Repose



Statutes of Repose
Dale G. Larrimore, Esquire
            Too often attorneys are so focused on the crucial deadlines imposed by the statutes of limitations, forgetting the companion restrictions created by the statutes of repose. Two important such statutes apply in medical negligence claims and in construction claims.
A statute of repose is defined as a “statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.”[1] Thus, a statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action;  the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.   Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.[2] While a statute of limitations merely bars a party's right to a remedy, a statute of repose completely abolishes and eliminates a party's cause of action.[3]
            Under the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act in Pennsylvania, “no cause of action asserting a medical professional liability claim may be commenced after seven years from the date of the alleged tort or breach of contract,” with exceptions only for foreign objects unintentionally left in the body and for minors’ claims.[4]  The harsh consequences of this statute came to light in four cases arising out unnecessary surgical procedures that were performed in a hospital in Philadelphia in 2004 through 2006. Early in 2012, Penn Medicine discovered that one of its doctors had been performing unnecessary cardiac procedures for almost ten years.  Penn Medicine informed the doctor’s patients and the public generally about the misconduct on April 2, 2013, and litigation ensued in Philadelphia against the doctor and Penn Medicine. Defendants filed motions to dismiss in four claims relating to procedures performed more than 7 years before suit was filed, on the basis that they were precluded by the MCARE Act’s Statute of Repose.  In her opinions in all four cases, issued on October 22, 2015, the Honorable Frederica Massiah-Jackson held she was “constrained to agree” that the claims were barred.[5] Even though the plaintiff had just been informed recently that they had been operated on unnecessarily, the “discovery rule” does not help to preserve a claim from the statute of repose. As was noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corporation, a statute of repose “bars a plaintiff’s suit before it happens; completely abolishes and eliminates the cause of action.” [6] 
            A statute of repose can also affect injury claims arising of poor construction of a building. Any civil action against a person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or construction of any improvement to real property must be commenced within twelve (12) years after completion of construction to recover damages for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage arising out of any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or construction of the improvement.[7]  However, if an injury occurs more than 10 years and less than 12 years after completion of the improvement, a civil action may be commenced no later than 14 years after completion of construction of such improvement.
The Pennsylvania Statute of Repose effectively eliminates the cause of action 12 years after the completion of construction of an improvement to real property, regardless of when an injury occurred.[8] However, this defense is not available to the owners or tenants who are in actual possession or control of the property.[9]
In interpreting this statute, a common subject of dispute is whether or not a particular object or structure is an “improvement to real property.”  In Noll by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA,[10] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described an improvement as “a valuable addition to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, duty or utility or to adapt it for new further purposes.” An improvement includes everything that permanently enhances the value of real property. 
Pennsylvania courts recognize that the most problematic area is often dealing with a chattel or personalty which is attached to real property.[11] The courts have held that a fixture is by definition an improvement to real property. There is a three part test used in determining when an article of personalty is a fixture: (1) the relative permanence of attachment to realty; (2) the extent to which the chattel is essential to the use of the realty; and (3) the intention of the parties to make a permanent addition to realty. In the Noll case, the Supreme Court held that whether an object is a fixture must be determined by the court, and the factors to be determined include the degree to which, and the manner in which, the object is attached to the real property; the ease of removing the object; whether the object may be removed without damaging the real property; how long the object has been attached to the real property; whether the object is necessary or essential to the real property; and the conduct of the party and whether it evidences an intent to permanently attach the object to realty.
            Attorneys have to recognize that whenever the statute of repose is applicable, plaintiffs must comply with both the statute of repose and the statute of limitations. As an example, for an injury from defective construction, the plaintiff must file suit against the contractor within 2 years of the date of injury and within 12 years of the date of completion of the construction. As an example, consider a matter where construction of a building was completed on May 1, 2000 and the plaintiff is injured on July 15, 2015 as a result of a deficiency in the design or construction of the building. The statute of limitations deadline in Pennsylvania would be July 15, 2017, but the statute of repose deadline is May 1, 2012. The plaintiff must file suit against the contractor within 2 years of the date of injury AND within 12 years of the date of completion of the construction. Since the earlier one here is the statute of repose, the contractor (or any person performing the design, planning, supervision or construction of the building) would be able to use the statute of repose as a defense to the claim.    


[1] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (8th ed.2004).
[2] City of McKeesport v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Miletti), 560 Pa. 413, 746 A.2d 87 (2000)
[3] Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 537 Pa. 274, 643 A.2d 81 (1994).
[4]40 P.S. § 1303.513.  
[5]Mathai v. Banka, et al., Phila. CCP No. 131102814; Deni v. Banka, et al., Phila. CCP No. 131200327; Gallagher v. Banka, et al., Phila. CCP No. 131203573; Wolfberg v. Banka, et al., Phila. CCP No. 131203574.
[6] Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2009),
[7] 42 Pa.C.S. §5536.
[8] Vargo v. Koppers Co., 552 Pa. 371, 715. A.2d 423, (1998).
[9] 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5536(b)(2).
[10] Noll by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 537 Pa. 274, 643 A.2d 81 (1994).
[11] See, e.g., Radvin v. General Electric Company, 576 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. 1990).