Pedestrians,
Crosswalks and Rights-of-Way[1]
Dale
G. Larrimore, Esquire
A
pedestrian is defined in the Vehicle Code to be a natural person afoot,[2]
but in a very real sense, everyone is a pedestrian. Whether you drive a car,
ride a bicycle, or take a bus to school, work, shop or play, your journey
always begins and ends on foot.
A
pedestrian is killed in a traffic accident every two hours in the United
States.[3]
Pedestrian fatalities now account for 15 percent of total traffic deaths, with
another 150,000 injuries requiring emergency room treatment for non-fatal
crash-related injuries.[4]
These sobering statistics make it
evident that pedestrians and motorists need to understand the risk factors
associated with sharing the road, but many studies have indicated that most
people have a limited understanding of right-of-way rules.[5]
Generally,
pedestrians have the right-of-way at intersections, but not when crossing
between intersections,[6]
and when entering into the crossing point of two roadways, all motorists are
required to yield to pedestrians who are in a crosswalk.[7]
Under the Vehicle Code, when traffic-control signals are not in place or not in
operation, a motorist must yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the
roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at the
intersection.[8]
Because pedestrians have the right of way
while crossing a roadway in a crosswalk, it is crucial to recognize that this
path of safety does not have to be marked to be considered as crosswalks. Under
the Vehicle Code, a crosswalk includes any portion of a roadway (whether in an intersection
or elsewhere) that is distinctly marked for pedestrian crossing, but the term
also includes any part of a road, whether marked with lines or not, “at an
intersection” that is included “within the extension of the lateral lines of an
existing sidewalk” leading to the intersection.[9]
A
pedestrian must exercise due care in crossing any street, but the mere fact
that a pedestrian crossed between intersections is not sufficient to
demonstrate any negligence on the part of the pedestrian.[10]
Whether or not a pedestrian exercised such due care must be determined by a
jury. However, every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than
within a crosswalk has a higher duty of care and must yield the right-of-way to
all vehicles upon the roadway.[11]
The
rights of a pedestrian upon a public roadway are equal to those of a vehicle.[12]
A motorist's right to use a public roadway is not superior to those rights
possessed by a pedestrian and the fact that the roadways are heavily traveled
does not function to transform the rights of motorists; it merely requires the
need for the exercise of greater care in proportion to the increased risk.[13]
In
assessing fault in any pedestrian accident, it is appropriate to take into
consideration all surrounding circumstances, such as a hill that would obscure
oncoming traffic, whether the roadway is one-way or two-way, and whether the
pedestrian is carrying anything or walking a dog that might distract his
attention.[14] People
texting, or even talking on a cell phone, are distracted and this lack of
attention to where they are walking is creating more and more accidents every
year. When crossing a street at other than a regular crossing, a pedestrian
must look before undertaking to cross the street and must continue to look
while proceeding across, look again when reaching the center of the highway and
continue to look while crossing the final lanes of the road.[15]
Where a motorist sees a pedestrian standing in the street obviously waiting for
the motorist to advance, the pedestrian's conduct constitutes an invitation for
the motorist to do so.[16]
Pedestrians
have a right to rely on the assumption that motorists will not be negligent and
will not run them down, as all motorists owe a duty of care to all pedestrians
in the immediate zone of danger. [17]
A pedestrian has a perfect right to rely on the exercise of reasonable care by
the drivers of automobiles on highways, as any person with the right of way has
the right to presume that others will comply with the duty to recognize it and
yield to it.[18] In
the memorable words of Justice Michael A. Musmanno:
The driver of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring pedestrians, and a motorist will not be permitted to avoid liability where the accident results from the failure to drive with the necessary care under the circumstances.23 However, a motorist is not liable for a collision between the vehicle and a pedestrian when the collision is the result of the pedestrian's negligence, or where the accident resulted through the negligence of neither the pedestrian nor the motorist.24“A pedestrian who has violated no traffic law and is traversing a street at a regular crossing has the right to stop traffic until he passes by in safety, even as Moses held back the Red Sea. To say that a pedestrian may not cross a street merely because an automobile may be in view is equivalent to saying that the machine has rights superior to those of a human being. The converse is true. Everything else being equal, the automobile must give way to the prerogatives of the foot passenger who does not wear a steel coat and is not equipped with bumpers and fenders to protect him in any conflict with his four-wheeled potential adversary.”[19]
A
motorist is negligent if he allows his vehicle to run into a pedestrian
standing in a roadway where the motorist has enough space to avoid the
pedestrian.25 When a driver observes,
or with reasonable care ought to observe, a pedestrian in time to escape
collision between her vehicle and the pedestrian, the vehicle operator must do
so.26 A
motorist's negligence will turn, to a large degree, upon whether the motorist
had the opportunity to see the pedestrian for a reasonable distance before
making contact.27 Where a motorist hits a
pedestrian who has been standing upon the roadway in clear view for a
sufficient length of time to have been seen and avoided by the motorist, such
action can be interpreted to be negligence as a matter of law on the part of
the motorist.28 This rule particularly
holds true when the pedestrian does not suddenly change his or her course.29 The failure of a motorist to give a
pedestrian a warning of the vehicle's approach is also evidence of negligence.30
For
a motorist to be negligent by striking a pedestrian, the pedestrian must have
been on the road long enough for a careful driver to have had time to avoid
hitting that pedestrian.31 Where
there is an unobstructed view of the highway, there is an inference that a
motorist will see any pedestrian upon that highway in front of his or her
vehicle. Even where there is an obstruction, its presence becomes irrelevant in
a determination of whether a motorist was liable for striking a pedestrian when
the motorist acknowledges observing a pedestrian on the highway despite the
obstruction to the motorist's view.33
The
duty of care of pedestrians crossing a street can be summarized as follows:37
(1) Pursuant
to Section 3543(a) of the Vehicle Code, every pedestrian crossing a roadway at
a point other than within a crosswalk at an intersection or any marked
crosswalk must yield the right-of-way to vehicles.
(2) Although Section 3543(a) requires
yielding, it does not prohibit crossing, and the mere fact that a pedestrian
crosses a street between intersections does not establish negligence on the
part of the pedestrian.38
(3) A pedestrian crossing a street at
other than a marked crosswalk or a crosswalk at an intersection is required to
exercise a higher degree of care than a pedestrian crossing at an intersection
or in a marked crosswalk,39 and the pedestrian must look before beginning
to crossing the street and continue to look while proceeding.40
(5) A pedestrian has the right to rely
on the exercise of reasonable care by motorists.41
(6) Whether a pedestrian has exercised
due care in crossing a street at other than a marked crosswalk or a crosswalk
at an intersection is a question of fact for the jury.42
[1]
For a more
thorough and detailed analysis of Pennsylvania law controlling the operation of
vehicles through intersections, see Dale G. Larrimore, Pennsylvania Rules of the Road, §§ 8.10 (West’s
Pennsylvania Practice Series, Vol. 13)(2015-2016).
[2] 75 Pa.C.S. §102.
[3]
National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Traffic Safety Facts 2013 Data -
Pedestrians. Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration; 2015. Publication no. DOT-HS-812-124. Accessed
February 17, 2016. (Citing statistics from Fatality Analysis Reporting System,
in 2013, 4,735 pedestrians were killed in traffic crashes in the United States,
an average of one crash-related pedestrian death every 2 hours. According to
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, there were almost 4900
pedestrian fatalities in 2014, and an additional 10 percent increase was
projected for 2015.)
[4] Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. WISQARS (Web-based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System). Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services,
CDC; 2015. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars. Accessed
February 17, 2016
[5] Hatfield, J.,
Fernandes, R.F., Soames, J., & Smith, K. (2007). Misunderstanding of
right-of-way rules at various pedestrian crossings: Observational study and
survey, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 39, 833-842; Mitman, M.F., &
Ragland, D.R. (2007). Crosswalk confusion: More evidence why pedestrian and
driver knowledge of the vehicle code should not be assumed. Transportation
Research Record, 2002, 55-63. Washington, DC: National Research Council.
[6]
Morris v.
Moss, 290 Pa. Super. 587, 435 A.2d 184 (1981). See also 75 Pa.C.S. §3543(a).
[7]
Chaudhuri
v. Capital Area Transit, 131 A.3d 589 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 2016), citing Bressler v.
Dannon Yogurt, 573 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. 1990) & Barney v. Foradas, 451 A.2d
710 (Pa. Super. 1982).
[8]
75 Pa.C.S.
§3542(a).
[9]
75 Pa.C.S.
§102.
[10]
Bressler
v. Dannon Yogurt, 392 Pa. Super. 475, 573 A.2d 562 (1990); Lavely v. Wolota,
253 Pa. Super. 196, 384 A.2d 1298 (1978).
[11]
75 Pa.C.S.
§3543.See also, Chaudhuri v. Capital Area Transit, 131 A.3d 589 (Pa.Commw. Ct.
2016).
[12]
Twinn v.
Noble, 270 Pa. 500, 113 A. 686 (1921); see
Aaron v. Strausser, 360 Pa. 82, 59 A.2d 910 (1948) (vehicle operator and a
pedestrian are each under a duty to respect lawful rights of each other).
[13]
Everitt v.
Auchu, 66 Pa. Super. 443, 1917 WL 3264 (1917).
[14]
Sweigert
v. Mazer, 410 Pa. 71, 188 A.2d 472 (1963).
[15]
Auel v.
White, 389 Pa. 208, 213, 132 A.2d 350, 353 (1957)); Bressler v. Dannon Yogurt,
392 Pa. Super. 475, 573 A.2d 562, 567 (1990); Parker v. Jones, 423 Pa. 15, 223
A.2d 229 (1966).
[16]
Griswold
v. Drumheller, 60 Montg. 147 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
[17]
Aaron v.
Strausser, 360 Pa. 82, 59 A.2d 910 (1948); Mazzagatti v. Everingham by
Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672, 679 (1986); Lavely v. Wolota, 253 Pa. Super.
196, 384 A.2d 1298 (1978).
[18]
Barney v.
Foradas, 451 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. 1982).
[19]
Frisina v.
Dailey, 150 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1959).
23 Berk v. LeQuin,
412 Pa. 88, 194 A.2d 136 (1963); Benn v. Brown, 409 Pa. 22, 185 A.2d 326
(1962).
24 Benn v. Brown,
409 Pa. 22, 185 A.2d 326 (1962).
25 Benn v. Brown,
409 Pa. 22, 185 A.2d 326 (1962).
26 Berry v.
Lintner, 226 Pa. Super. 562, 323 A.2d 253 (1974).
27 Calloway v.
Greenawalt, 82 Dauph. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
28 Pinto v. Bell
Fruit Co., 148 Pa. Super. 132, 24 A.2d 768 (1942); Rost v. Wickenheiser, 229
Pa. Super. 84, 323 A.2d 154 (1974).
29 Matzasoszki v.
Jacobson, 122 Pa. Super. 180, 186 A. 227 (1936).
30 Sadler v. Frost,
14 Cumb. L.J. 10 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
31 Moore v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 364 Pa. 343, 72 A.2d 117 (1950).
33 Haas v. Wesley,
140 Pa. Super. 453, 14 A.2d 179 (1940).
37 Sadoski v.
Regula, 2008 WL 4453475 (Pa. C.P. 2008).
38 Stong v. Com.,
817 A.2d 576, 585–586 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
39 Bressler v. Dannon
Yogurt, 392 Pa. Super. 475, 484, 573 A.2d 562, 567 (1990).
40 Sweigert v.
Mazer, 410 Pa. 71, 74, 188 A.2d 472, 473 (1963).
41 Wright v.
Eastman, 63 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2013); Lavely v. Wolota, 253 Pa. Super.
196, 202, 384 A.2d 1298, 1302 (1978).
42 See, e.g.,
Bressler v. Dannon Yogurt, 392 Pa. Super. 475, 573 A.2d 562 (1990)
